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Whether, for purposes of issuer liability under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77k, a 
statement in a registration statement attempting to 
characterize a verifiable, present fact about the legal 
validity of contracts as a “belief ” rather than a fact 
can shield an issuer from liability. 
ii 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici are scholars at American law and business 
schools whose research and teaching focus on federal 
securities regulation and the governance of public 
corporations. Two of the four authors appearing as 
counsel on this brief have together submitted to this 
Court briefs on prior occasions as amici in cases aris-
ing under the federal securities laws on behalf of law 
and business faculty.2 Amici have an interest in en-
suring a proper interpretation of the statutory frame-
work put in place by Congress under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. §77k. Amici 
have no financial stake in the outcome of this litiga-
tion.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
 1 This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by coun-
sel for either party, and no person other than amici and their 
academic institutions contributed monetarily to the preparation 
or submission of this brief. None of the schools that employ 
amici are a signatory to this brief, and the views expressed here 
are not affiliated with those institutions. This amicus brief is 
filed pursuant to the blanket consent executed by both parties 
and filed with this Court (by Respondents and Petitioners on 
March 28, 2014).  
 2 Two of the four authors on this brief also submitted 
amicus briefs on behalf of law and business faculty in Merck & 
Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) and in Matrixx Initiatives, 
Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). See Br. of Amici Cu-
riae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of Resp’ts, 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, No. 08-905, Oct. 26, 2009; Br. for 
Professors at Law and Business Schools as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Resp’ts, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 
09-1156, Nov. 12, 2010.  
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 This is a garden-variety action alleging false 
disclosure that requires nothing more than applica-
tion of settled principles under the federal securities 
laws. The statement at issue is one of present mate-
rial fact, not opinion. Falsity is established, as Re-
spondents have alleged, through evidence showing 
that the statement at issue was incorrect on the date 
made.  
 Respondents seek to recover under Section 11 of 
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77k (“1933 
Act”), for alleged misstatements of material fact made 
by Petitioners. The provision makes actionable a mis-
statement or omission of a material fact in an ef-
fective registration statement. 15 U.S.C. §77k(a). To 
establish a prima facie case, a purchaser of the se-
curities subject to the registration statement “need 
only show a material misstatement or omission. . . .” 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 
(1983).  
 Respondents have met this standard. Petitioners 
represented in the registration statement that “[w]e 
believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers are legally and economically valid ar-
rangements that bring value to the healthcare system 
and the patients that we serve.” Second Am. Com-
plaint (“Complaint”) ¶46. The Complaint asserts that 
the statement was materially false and misleading 
“when made.” Id. at ¶47. The Complaint includes 
a number of allegations, which, when taken as true, 
3 
demonstrate that the contracts were not legally valid 
at the time of the statement. See id. at ¶47-90. The 
Sixth Circuit found these allegations sufficient to 
demonstrate falsity. See Ind. State Dist. Council v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 505-07 (6th Cir. 2013), 
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1490 (2014).  
 Petitioners, however, contend that the statement 
should be characterized as an “opinion.” Relying on 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 
(1991), they assert that the falsity of an opinion can 
only be shown through evidence of subjective dis-
belief. We disagree with this characterization of the 
statement at issue as an opinion. A representation 
about the legal validity of contracts, like other mat-
ters of present fact, can be false on the date made. To 
the extent, for example, that contracts are conduits 
for illegal kickbacks, it will not always be necessary 
for an issuer to obtain a court ruling or await future 
developments to know that the contracts are invalid.  
 A speaker may, in some cases, express an opinion 
or belief with respect to present facts. An opinion in 
these circumstances conveys uncertainty or doubt as 
to the accuracy of the representation. Where, how-
ever, the speaker possesses information establishing 
the plain invalidity of the stated facts, the requisite 
uncertainty does not exist. Nor does the issuer create 
uncertainty by adding the words “[w]e believe” to the 
statement.  
 Allowing an issuer to escape liability for untrue 
statements of present fact in a registration statement 
4 
by treating them as beliefs or opinions contradicts the 
statutory framework set out in, and policies under-
lying, Section 11. See 15 U.S.C. §77k. Under the pro-
vision, issuers are assigned unique responsibility for 
ensuring the accuracy of a registration statement. In-
siders and underwriters are permitted to avoid liabil-
ity for a false representation where they “believe” 
that the facts in the registration statement are accu-
rate. See 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3) (providing that insiders 
and underwriters can avoid liability where, “after rea-
sonable investigation,” they had “reasonable ground 
to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the 
registration statement became effective, that the 
statements therein were true and that there was no 
omission to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein 
not misleading”).  
 Issuers, in contrast, are held to a standard of 
liability that is “virtually absolute. . . .” Herman & 
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. They are specifically de-
nied the right to raise as a defense to a Section 11 
claim alleging a misrepresentation or omission of 
material fact that they “believe” otherwise. See 15 
U.S.C. §77k(b) (due diligence defense applicable to 
those “other than the issuer”). Issuers, therefore, 
have additional incentive to verify the accuracy of 
the registration statement.  
 Permitting a statement about the validity of con-
tracts to be treated as a belief or opinion when the 
issuer possesses information to the contrary fun-
damentally alters this regulatory scheme. If such 
5 
treatment is judicially validated, issuers will be able 
to rely on a litigation strategy that Congress sought 
to foreclose in denying issuers the right to resort to a 
reasonable belief defense under Section 11. Moreover, 
the approach effectively introduces into Section 11 a 
state of mind requirement. Purchasers required to 
establish a subjective disbelief as to present facts 
will be obligated to present evidence similar to that 
needed to demonstrate scienter.  
 To the extent, however, that this Court treats the 
statements at issue as opinions, we do not agree that 
the matter is “answered” by the decision in Virginia 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
See Pet’r’s Br. at 2. In Virginia Bankshares, this 
Court “confine[d]” its analysis to statements of opin-
ion by directors that were not subjectively believed. 
501 U.S. at 1090. The Court did not, therefore, re-
solve the standard for showing the falsity of opinions 
in the absence of allegations of subjective insincerity.  
 We agree with the Government that opinions 
sincerely held may nonetheless be false if they lack a 
reasonable basis, a longstanding and familiar test 
widely used under the federal securities laws. Lower 
courts and the common law also recognize that an 
opinion may be false where the maker possesses un-
disclosed facts that contradict the accuracy of the 
statement.  
 In this case, Respondents have alleged that Pe-
titioners possessed facts demonstrating that the con-
tracts referenced in its statement were invalid on the 
6 
date the statement was made. This allegation, as the 
Sixth Circuit found, is sufficient to allege falsity. To 
the extent that Petitioners’ statement is treated as an 
opinion, Respondents have alleged facts sufficient to 
meet the pleading standards applicable in Section 11 
actions. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Representation in the Registration 
Statement about the Legal Validity of Con-
tracts Is a Statement of Present, Verifiable 
Fact, the Falsity of Which can be Deter-
mined through the Use of Settled Princi-
ples of Law 
 According to the Complaint, Petitioners repre-
sented in the registration statement that “[w]e believe 
that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers are legally and economically valid arrangements 
that bring value to the healthcare system and the 
patients that we serve.” Complaint ¶46. Petitioners 
have characterized the statement as one of opinion 
that can be “objectively erroneous. . . .”3 Pet’r’s Br. 18 
 
 3 An opinion may in some cases not be objectively verifiable 
under any circumstances. See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 
1090 (petitioners describing opinions at issue in that case as 
“indefinite and unverifiable expressions”). See also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §538A (“A representation is one of opinion if 
it expresses only . . . (b) his judgment as to quality, value, 
authenticity, or other matters of judgment.”). In this case, 
however, Petitioners recognize that a statement of legal validity 
(Continued on following page) 
7 
n. 4. They assert, however, that the statement at is-
sue cannot be definitively true or false on the date 
made “except in the rare case in which a court has 
already definitively ruled on the legality of the issu-
er’s actions.” Pet’r’s Br. 35. Instead, “ultimate accu-
racy of the stated belief hinges on future events and 
the decisions of judges, juries, and regulators.” Id. 
 It is true that contracts described as legally valid 
today may be found to be invalid tomorrow. In some 
cases, a basis for invalidity of a contract may be 
known but unresolved.4 In other cases, validity may 
depend upon unexpected but ultimately successful 
challenges by “[c]reative counsel.” See Zucker v. 
Andreessen, No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *8 
(Del. Ch. June 21, 2012). Sometimes the law will 
change, causing a contract to no longer be valid. In-
deed, these sorts of uncertainties are an inherent and 
important attribute of the common law system, par-
ticularly with respect to corporate governance and 
capital-raising. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Lisa L. 
 
can be “objectively false.” See Pet’r’s Br. 27 (asserting that 
statement must be “ ‘both objectively false and disbelieved by the 
defendant at the time it was expressed.’ ”) (quoting Fait v. 
Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011)).  
 4 We note, however, that where the speaker is aware of 
existing challenges to the validity of contracts, even though 
unresolved, a statement of legal validity may be materially in-
complete under the antifraud provisions. See Meyer v. JinkoSolar 
Holdings Co., No. 13-616-cv, 2014 WL 3747181, at *4 (2d Cir. 
July 31, 2014) (“Even when there is no existing independent 
duty to disclose information, once a company speaks on an issue 
or topic, there is a duty to tell the whole truth.”).  
8 
Casey, Corporate Governance: Cases and Materials 
733 (Lexis-Nexis 2012) (noting that common law 
countries “are typically more comfortable with legal 
requirements created by, or left to, the courts. The 
likely effect of judicially created legal requirements is 
that it can be changed more quickly, arguably pro-
viding both increased flexibility and increased uncer-
tainty.”).  
 A statement of legal validity is not, however, 
invariably dependent upon future events or a deter-
mination by a judge, jury, or regulator. A contract 
may be plainly and well understood to be invalid in 
the present. See Roberts v. Lanier, 72 So. 3d 1174, 
1187-88 (Ala. 2011) (where it was “undisputed that 
contractual provisions for non-refundable retainers 
[were] unenforceable,” case allowed to go forward as 
to whether certain defendants “misrepresented . . . 
that the contract as written was valid and enforce-
able. . . .”).5 
 
 5 Requiring a definitive ruling from a court as a precon-
dition for invalidity would preclude such a finding even where 
a legal opinion stated otherwise. See Marilou M. King, Esq. & 
Elizabeth S. Turqman, Esq., Year in Review, Seminar Materials, 
Health Law Update and Annual Meeting, Dallas, TX, June 4, 
1997, AHLA-PAPERS P06049705 (representing that “[a]fter en-
tering into the contract, [the company] was advised by counsel 
that the contract violated the federal Medicare Anti-Kickback 
Statute”). The need for a court decision to show invalidity seeks 
to impose the type of “bright-line” rule under the federal securi-
ties laws that this Court has twice rejected in other contexts. See 
Matrixx Initiatives, 131 S. Ct. at 1319 (rejecting “categorical 
rule” as test for materiality); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
(Continued on following page) 
9 
 Contracts can, therefore, be invalid ab initio 
where, for example, they lack mandatory formalities. 
See First Am. Kickapoo Operations, L.L.C. v. Multi-
media Games, Inc., 412 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 
2005) (“Certain formalities . . . must take place before 
an agreement becomes a contract. The regulations’ 
requirement that management contracts be approved 
to be valid creates no ontological mystery whereby 
a contract springs fully-fashioned from nothingness, 
but rather identifies a formality necessary before an 
agreement to manage a tribal gaming operation can 
become a contract so to manage. Lacking the formal-
ity . . . an agreement to manage does not become a 
contract: it is void.”).  
 Contracts that violate the terms of a statute may 
be invalid. See Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. §78cc(b) (contracts made in violation of title 
“shall be void”); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§774, cmt. a (“An agreement may be clearly illegal, as 
when it is forbidden by statute.”).  
 Contracts that involve an illegal purpose may 
also be invalid. See United States v. Mardirosian, 602 
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (“It is well-established that 
contracts for illegal purposes are void as a matter of 
public policy. . . . We tread no new ground in declaring 
that the act of demanding a fee for the return of 
stolen property is unlawful.”).  
 
U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (“We reject ‘agreement-in-principle as to 
price and structure’ as the bright-line rule for materiality.”).  
10 
 Contracts can be invalid as a result of violations 
of the federal Anti-Kickback statute. The law prohib-
its remuneration in return for patient referrals or 
in return for the purchase of goods, facilities, ser- 
vices or items paid for under a federal health care 
program. See 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b); see also 42 
C.F.R. §1001.952 (safe harbor for payments otherwise 
subject to Anti-Kickback statute). Contracts cannot, 
therefore, provide for payments that are inconsistent 
with these provisions. See Nursing Home Consultants 
v. Quantum Health Servs., 926 F. Supp. 835, 843-44 
(E.D. Ark. 1996), aff ’d, 112 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(marketing agreement “plainly falls within the literal 
purview” of Anti-Kickback statute and “[p]lainly . . . 
fails” to fall within safe harbor and, as a result, “is 
illegal, and hence unenforceable, in that it contem-
plates a business arrangement that is prohibited by 
§1320a-7b(b)(1), and which is not saved by the ‘safe 
harbor’ regulations.”). An agreement that appears to 
be valid on its face but is, in reality, a “sham” de-
signed to mask prohibited payments is an unlawful 
kickback arrangement. See Medicare and State 
Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-
Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35952-01 (July 29, 
1991) (“[S]ham contracts in which remuneration is 
exchanged for property that does not exist or space 
which is not used are among the most egregious 
kickback arrangements.”). To the extent that con-
tracts are conduits for illegal kickbacks, therefore, it 
will not always be necessary for an issuer to always 
obtain a court ruling or await future developments to 
know that such agreements are invalid. 
11 
 Courts interpreting the federal securities laws 
have recognized that statements of legal validity or 
compliance can be matters of present fact that may 
be false when made. In Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP 
v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2008), for 
example, the court addressed allegations that de-
fendants misrepresented in a merger agreement that 
the company was “ ‘in compliance in all material re-
spects with all laws’ ” and, specifically, that the com-
pany was “in compliance with the books and records 
provision of Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act. . . .” 
The court found that it was sufficient for plaintiff to 
allege “facts demonstrating that [the company] was 
not in compliance with Section 13(b) of the Exchange 
Act at the time the warranties were made. . . .” Id. at 
742 (emphasis in original); see also Reese v. Malone, 
747 F.3d 557, 578 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Statements of 
legal compliance are pled with adequate falsity when 
documents detail specific violations of law that 
existed at the time the warranties were made.”); In 
re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 939 
(D.N.J. 1998) (“[F]acts demonstrating [that the com-
pany] was not in compliance with the terms of the 
Credit Agreement from the moment it was signed 
would be important to a reasonable investor.”).6  
 
 6 Statements with respect to contracts can be misleading in 
other respects. Representations about the existence of a contract 
can be misleading where there is no intent to perform. See 
Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 
588, 596 (2001) (“To sell an option while secretly intending not to 
(Continued on following page) 
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 Admittedly, a speaker may sometimes express a 
genuine belief about a matter of present fact. An 
opinion in these circumstances conveys uncertainty 
or doubt as to the accuracy of the representation. See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §538A (“A representa-
tion is one of opinion if it expresses only (a) the belief 
of the maker, without certainty, as to the existence of 
a fact”); see also W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & 
Keeton on Torts §109, at 755 (5th ed. 1984) (“Prosser 
& Keeton”) (statement of opinion can “indicate[ ] some 
doubt as to the speaker’s belief in the existence of a 
state of facts”).  
 Where, however, the speaker possesses infor-
mation establishing plain invalidity, the requisite un-
certainty does not exist. Nor can the speaker create 
uncertainty by adding the words “[w]e believe” to the 
statement. As Justice Scalia reminded in Virginia 
Bankshares, “not every sentence that has the word 
‘opinion’ in it . . . leads us into this psychic thicket. 
Sometimes such a sentence actually represents facts 
as facts rather than opinions – and in that event no 
more need be done than apply the normal rules for 
§14(a) liability.” 501 U.S. 1108, 1109 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Torts §538A cmt. d 
(“The form of the statement is not, however, con-
trolling in all cases.”); Prosser & Keeton, at 755 (“It is 
not, however, the form of the statement which is 
 
permit the option’s exercise is misleading, because a buyer nor-
mally presumes good faith.”).  
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important or controlling, but the sense in which it is 
reasonably understood.”).  
 Allowing an issuer to escape liability for untrue 
statements of present fact in a registration statement 
by treating the statements as beliefs or opinions 
contradicts the statutory framework set out in, and 
policies underlying, Section 11 of the 1933 Act. See 15 
U.S.C. §77k. In adopting the 1933 Act, Congress 
sought to ensure that purchasers participating in a 
public offering were fully informed of all facts ma-
terial to the offering. See H.R. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2 (1933) (“There is, however, an obligation upon 
us to insist that every issue of new securities to be 
sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by 
full publicity and information, and that no essentially 
important element attending the issue shall be con-
cealed from the buying public.”) (President’s mes-
sage); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) 
(“The primary purpose of the Securities Act is to pro-
tect investors by requiring publication of material 
information thought necessary to allow them to make 
informed investment decisions concerning public of-
ferings of securities in interstate commerce.”).  
 Congress advanced this goal by assigning to is-
suers a unique role in maintaining the accuracy of 
the registration statement. To make out a prima facie 
case under Section 11, purchasers must only “show a 
material misstatement or omission” in an effective 
registration statement. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. 
at 382. Evidence of the speaker’s state of mind is 
not an element of such a claim. See Wagner v. First 
14 
Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 
2006) (“There is no state of mind element to a §11 
claim . . . .”).  
 For insiders and underwriters, however, evidence 
of falsity will generally not be enough.7 Although 
these participants play a “direct role” in the offering 
process, Section 11 provides a defense to an inaccu-
rate registration statement. Herman & MacLean, 459 
U.S. at 382. See also 15 U.S.C. §77k(a)(1-5). Congress 
allows insiders and underwriters to escape liability 
for misrepresentations or omissions of material fact 
if they reasonably and actually “believe” that the 
registration statement is accurate after a “reasonable 
investigation, . . . ” 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3). See also 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 n. 26 
(1976) (“Other individuals who sign the registration 
statement, directors of the issuer, and the under-
writer of the securities similarly are accorded a 
complete defense against civil liability based on the 
exercise of reasonable investigation and a reasonable 
belief that the registration statement was not mis-
leading.”).  
 
 7 See 77 Cong. Rec. 2934 (1933) (Statement by Rep. Chap-
man) (“Under the terms of this bill, the corporation itself is held 
absolutely responsible, but its management, underwriters, and 
so forth, are held only to the degree of responsibility above set 
out. To have made them guarantors of such securities, as some 
urged that they should be, would have worked an intolerable 
hardship on many honest and responsible business men . . . .”). 
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 Issuers, however, are not allowed the same op-
portunity to avoid liability. Recognizing that the inf-
ormation in a registration statement is, for the most 
part, within the unique control of issuers,8 Congress 
gave issuers additional incentive to verify the ac-
curacy of the registration statement by holding them 
to a standard of liability that is “virtually abso-
lute. . . .” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. Con-
sistent with this intent, issuers are expressly denied 
the right to defend against a misleading representa-
tion of material fact in a registration statement by 
taking the position that they “believe” otherwise. See 
15 U.S.C. §77k(b) (due diligence defense applicable to 
those “other than the issuer”).9 As a result, issuers 
can only avoid liability in a meaningful sense by en-
suring the factual accuracy of the registration state-
ment.10  
 
 8 See 77 Cong. Rec. 2914 (1933) (Statement of Rep. Green-
wood) (“There is a peculiar fact with respect to such investments 
in that the corporation that issues the securities knows more 
about them than anyone else, and the old rule of caveat emptor, 
or the buyer beware, certainly should not apply to this character 
of investments. The man who sells them ought to give the facts, 
and the Government ought to require the issuer of securities to 
give all the facts, and be honest with the public.”).  
 9 The right to reasonable and actual belief in the accuracy 
of the registration statement is commonly referred to as the “due 
diligence” defense. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Dili-
gence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 
Brandeis L.J. 549, 554 (2006).  
 10 Other than the obligation to bring an action within the 
statute of limitations, the only defense set out in the statute was 
(Continued on following page) 
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 Allowing an issuer to treat facts in registration 
statements as opinions or beliefs also introduces into 
Section 11 what is effectively a state of mind re-
quirement, at least where falsity is conditioned upon 
a showing of subjective disbelief. Purchasers seeking 
to establish a subjective disbelief as to facts in an 
effective registration statement will be required to 
produce evidence similar to what is needed to demon-
strate scienter. See In re Credit Suisse First Boston 
Corp. Analyst Reports Sec. Litig., 431 F.3d 36, 48 
(1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he subjective aspect of the falsity 
requirement and the scienter requirement essentially 
merge; the scienter analysis is subsumed by the 
analysis of subjective falsity.”). As a result, pur-
chasers will no longer be able to set out a prima 
facie case only by “show[ing] a material misstatement 
or omission . . . .” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 
382.  
 In sum, an issuer possessing information show-
ing that a representation of fact in a registration 
statement is untrue or misleading cannot defend 
against a claim of falsity by characterizing the state-
ment as a belief or opinion. Such an approach does 
not work an unnecessary hardship on issuers. While 
it limits the ability to treat facts in a registration 
statement as a belief or opinion, this approach does 
not prevent the inclusion in the registration statement 
of any suitably qualified representation of inherently 
 
that the purchaser “knew of such untruth or omission . . . .” 17 
U.S.C. §77k(a).  
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uncertain information, such as projections or other 
forward-looking statements. See Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. 
§230.175.  
 Moreover, issuers can avoid Section 11 liability 
altogether to the extent the relevant disclosure does 
not appear in the registration statement. See 15 
U.S.C. §77k. In the absence of a duty to disclose, is-
suers may remain silent. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. 
v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011) (noting 
that antifraud provisions “do not create an affirma-
tive duty to disclose any and all material infor-
mation.”). See also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 239 n. 17 (“Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is 
not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”). They also may, 
under certain circumstances, disclose “information 
the substance of which is not included in the registra-
tion statement” in a “free writing prospectus . . . .” 
Rule 433, 17 C.F.R. §230.433; see also Rule 165, 
17 C.F.R. §230.164. Information included in a 
“free writing prospectus” is not subject to Section 11 
liability.11  
   
 
 11 See Securities Offering Reform, Exchange Act Release No. 
52056, 70 Fed. Reg. 4472, 44759 (Aug. 3, 2005) (“Even when 
filed, a free writing prospectus will not be part of a registration 
statement subject to liability under Securities Act Section 11, 
unless the issuer elects to file it as a part of the registration 
statement.”).  
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II. Virginia Bankshares Does Not Determine 
the Standard of Review for a Statement of 
Opinion that is Subjectively Believed 
 To the extent this Court treats the statement at 
issue as an “opinion,” we do not agree that the appro-
priate standard for determining falsity is “answered” 
by the decision in Virginia Bankshares. See Pet’r’s Br. 
at 2. The Court in Virginia Bankshares expressly 
“confine[d]” its analysis to cases involving subjective 
disbelief. 501 U.S. at 1090 (“[W]e interpret the jury 
verdict as finding that the directors’ statements of 
belief and opinion were made with knowledge that 
the directors did not hold the beliefs or opinions ex-
pressed, and we confine our discussion to statements 
so made.”). The decision, therefore, left open the stan-
dard for determining the falsity of an opinion in the 
absence of allegations of subjective disbelief.  
 Particularly in the commercial context, opinions 
expressed by those with superior knowledge are un-
derstood to be more than a matter of pure specula-
tion.12 See Prosser & Keeton, at 760-61 (“There is 
quite general agreement that such an assertion is to 
be implied where the defendant holds himself out or 
is understood as having special knowledge of the mat-
ter which is not available to the plaintiff, so that his 
opinion becomes in effect an assertion summarizing 
 
 12 Congress, in adopting Section 11, recognized the “peculiar 
fact” that the corporation issuing the securities “knows more 
about them than anyone else . . . .” See supra note 8.  
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his knowledge.”) (footnote omitted). Instead, they must 
be supported by a sufficient factual predicate. See 
Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1093 (noting that 
the opinions at issue were “reasonably understood to 
rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate, 
the absence of which renders them misleading.”); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Torts §539 cmt. b (“The 
statement of opinion may not only imply that the 
maker knows of no fact incompatible with the opin-
ion, but, when the circumstances justify it, may also 
reasonably be understood to imply that he does know 
facts sufficient to justify him in forming the opinion 
and that the facts known to him do justify him.”).  
 This is particularly true where the opinion is, as 
is the case here, expressly characterized as a belief. A 
belief does more than articulate a subjective view or 
uncertainty. It conveys “confidence” in the accuracy 
of the statement. See 1 Shorter Oxford English Dic-
tionary 213 (second definition of believe: “Put one’s 
trust or have confidence in (or on) the truth of (a 
proposition, doctrine, etc.), the efficacy or advisability 
of (a principle, institution, practice, etc.), the exis-
tence of (a person or thing), the occurrence of (an 
event)”). Confidence in turn suggests a “firm trust” in 
the position. See id. at 483 (first definition of confi-
dence: “Firm trust, reliance, faith in.” Fourth defini-
tion: “Assured expectation; the state of feeling certain 
of.”). An expression of belief, therefore, indicates to 
investors that the maker has a strong foundation for 
the statement. 
20 
 The Government has, on brief in this case, as-
serted that an opinion can be false where it lacks “a 
basis that is reasonable under the circumstances.” 
Gov.’s Br. 6. We agree that this is an appropriate 
standard for assessing whether an opinion has an 
adequate foundation. Lower courts have routinely 
applied the reasonable basis standard to statements 
of belief and opinion. See Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849, 
855 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 
857 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Helwig v. Vencor, 
Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 557 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); In 
re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 930 (9th 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 917 (1994). Likewise 
the standard is commonly applied in the context of 
forward-looking information. See Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. 
§230.175 (safe harbor for forward-looking statements 
that does not apply in the absence of a “reasonable 
basis” for such statement). 
 An opinion or belief can also be false where the 
maker possesses undisclosed facts that contradict the 
accuracy of the statement. Such an understanding 
is consistent with the Restatement of Torts, see Re-
statement (Second) of Torts §539(1) (statement of 
opinion may be interpreted as “an implied statement 
(a) that the facts known to the maker are not incom-
patible with his opinion”), and the common law. 
See Prosser & Keeton, at 760 (“[I]t has been recog-
nized very often that the expression of an opinion 
may carry with it an implied assertion, not only that 
the speaker knows no facts which would preclude 
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such an opinion, but that he does know facts which 
justify it.”) (footnote omitted). See also Kimmell v. 
Schaefer, 224 A.D.2d 217, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st 
Dep’t), aff ’d, 89 N.Y.2d 257 (1996) (“[W]here one 
party does have superior knowledge, the expression 
of an opinion implies that the declarant knows facts 
which support that opinion and that he knows noth-
ing which contradicts the statement.”) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  
 Lower courts interpreting the federal securities 
laws have recognized that a statement of belief can be 
false under these circumstances. See Reese, 747 F.3d 
at 579; City of Monroe Employees Retirement System 
v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 675 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 936 (2005); see also Bissett v. Ply-
Gem Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 142, 146 (11th Cir. 1976) 
(“[A] plaintiff may recover upon a showing that the 
defendant knew, or should have known, that the facts 
in his possession invalidated the opinion which he 
expressed.”). The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has expressed a similar position in the context 
of forward-looking information. See Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Br. as Amicus Curiae Filed 
in Response to Ct. Order, 1, Slayton, et al. v. Am. 
Express Co., et al., No. 08-5442-cv, 2d Cir. Jan. 21, 
2010.  
 In addition to the standard for subjective dis-
belief set out in Virginia Bankshares, therefore, a 
statement of opinion or belief can be false if it is 
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unsupported by a reasonable basis or the maker pos-
sesses undisclosed facts that contradict the accuracy 
of the statement. Respondents in this case have 
alleged that Petitioners were in possession of facts on 
the effective date of the registration statement at 
issue demonstrating that the contracts with phar-
maceutical companies were not legally valid. Re-
spondents, therefore, have sufficiently alleged that 
the Petitioners’ statement was false when made or 
omits to state facts necessary to make the statement, 
in the light of the circumstances in which it was 
made, not misleading.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this case, Respondents have not challenged 
the statement as to the validity of the contracts by 
resorting to arguments that rely on the uncertainty 
of the legal system.13 Their claims are not dependent 
upon future changes in the law or the arguments of 
“creative counsel.” They have alleged that the state-
ment at issue was false “when made.” Complaint 
  
 
 13 To the extent addressing a statement that can be both 
historical and dependent on future developments, courts in these 
circumstances look to the way in which the plaintiffs have 
framed the claim. See Spitzberg v. Houston Am. Energy Corp., 
No. 13-20519, 2014 WL 3442515, at *12 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014) 
(although conceding that the term “reserve” may be “character-
ized as forward-looking” in some circumstances, plaintiffs’ alle-
gations “focus on that component of the term . . . that had 
already occurred”).  
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¶47. The Complaint includes a number of allegations 
designed to show that the contracts were not legally 
valid on the effective date of the registration state-
ment. See id. at ¶¶47-90. The Sixth Circuit found, 
and we agree, that these allegations were sufficient to 
establish falsity. See Ind. State Dist. Council of La-
borers, 719 F.3d at 505-07. 
 For these reasons, amici respectfully urge this 
Honorable Court to affirm the ruling of the United 
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